Yusuf Neggers

Publications

“Indian Female Migrants Face Greater Barriers to Post-Covid Recovery than Males: Evidence from a Panel Study” (with Jenna Allard, Maulik Jagnani, Rohini Pande, Simone Schaner, and Charity Troyer Moore), eClinicalMedicine (Lancet), 53: 101631, November 2022. [Paper]
[Indian Express]

Abstract: India's abrupt nationwide Covid−19 lockdown internally displaced millions of migrant workers, who returned to distant rural homes. Documenting their labour market reintegration is a critical aspect of understanding the economic costs of the pandemic for India's poor. In a country marked by low and declining female labour force participation, identifying gender gaps in labour market reintegration – as a marker of both women's vulnerability at times of crisis and setbacks in women's agency – is especially important. Beginning in April 2020 we enrolled roughly 4,600 displaced migrants who had, during the lockdown, returned to two of India's poorest states into a cohort observational study which tracked enrolees through July 2021. Displaced migrants of both genders experienced persistent hardships for over a year after the initial pandemic lockdown. Women fared worse, driven by both lower rates of remigration and lower rates of labour market re-entry both inside and outside home villages. Some women dropped out of the labour force entirely, but most unemployed reported seeking or being available to work. In short, pandemic-induced labour market displacement had far-reaching, long-term consequences for migrant workers, especially women.

“Enfranchising Your Own? Experimental Evidence on Bureaucrat Diversity and Election Bias in India”, 
American Economic Review, 108(6): 1288-1321, June 2018. (Lead Article) [Paper]
[Ideas For India / IGC] [AEA]

Abstract: This paper investigates the effects of polling station administrator diversity on elections in India, using a natural experiment: the random assignment of government officials to teams managing stations on election day, together with surveys conducted with voters and election officers. I demonstrate that changes in the religious and caste composition of officer teams impact voting at the polling station level, causing shifts in coalition vote shares large enough to influence election outcomes. Effects are strongest when officers have greater discretion over the voting process. I also provide evidence suggesting own-group favoritism by election personnel as one relevant mechanism.

“Can Electronic Procurement Improve Infrastructure Provision? Evidence from Public Works in India and Indonesia” (with Sean Lewis-Faupel, Benjamin A. Olken, and Rohini Pande),
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(3): 258-83, August 2016. [Paper]

Abstract: This paper examines whether electronic procurement (e-procurement), which increases access to information and reduces personal interactions with potentially corrupt officials, improves procurement outcomes. We develop unique datasets from India and Indonesia and use variation in adoption of e-procurement within both countries. We find no evidence of reduced prices but do find that e-procurement leads to quality improvements. In India, where we observe quality directly, e-procurement improves road quality, and in Indonesia, e-procurement reduces delays. Regions with e-procurement are more likely to have winners come from outside the region. On net, the results suggest that e-procurement facilitates entry from higher quality contractors.

Working Papers

“Surveillance of Repression: Theory and Implementation”, with Veli M. Andirin, Mehdi Shadmehr, and Jesse M. Shapiro. [Draft, October 2025]
Revise and Resubmit (3rd round), Econometrica.

Abstract: A repressive regime can suppress dissent (e.g., protest) after it manifests (e.g., by beating or arresting protesters) or prevent it beforehand (e.g., by obstructing public spaces). We separately study and measure these two forms of repression, focusing on the case of political protest. We show in a model that preventive repression makes protest less predictable. We introduce a new database of security alerts that includes advance warning of protest. We validate the database against objectively measured events and use it to produce global, monthly indices of repression grounded in our model. We show that these indices track salient episodes of repression and predict public expressions of human rights concerns. We find that additional government resources increase prevention but not suppression. We argue that these indices can be a valuable tool for surveillance by the international community and analysis by the research community.

“From Delay to Payday: Easing Bureaucratic Access to Implementation Information Strengthens Social Protection Delivery”, with Eric Dodge, Rohini Pande, and Charity Troyer Moore. [Draft, July 2025]
[VoxDev] [VoxEU]
Revise and Resubmit, American Economic Review.

Abstract: A field experiment covering over 25 million poor citizens varied bureaucrat access to “PayDash”, a digital application providing wage processing information for India’s workfare program. PayDash reduced wage processing delays by 1.4 days, boosted work provision by 10%, and reduced managerial changes by 24% without affecting audit-detected misconduct. PayDash had similar impacts when provided to managers, supervisors, or both, indicating substitutability and implying that information frictions constrained implementation by hindering coordination rather than by enabling managerial rent-seeking. Investing $1 in PayDash lowers payday loan interest payments for liquidity-constrained households by over $7, while enabling 63 additional days of paid work.

“Learning, Salience, and Voting: Evidence from Criminal Politicians in India”, with Siddharth George and Sarika Gupta. [Draft, May 2026]
[VoxDev]
Submitted.

Abstract: We study how voters process information through two experiments around Indian elections. In a large-scale experiment, we show that providing voters information about candidates’ criminal charges increases votes for clean candidates and reduces votes for criminal politicians, with larger penalties for candidates facing more and serious charges. A follow-up experiment replicates these results and identifies two mechanisms. First, information facilitates learning: voters form more accurate beliefs and evaluate criminal candidates less favourably. Second, using direct measures of voter attention, we show that information makes criminality more salient, and increases its weight in voting decisions. Salience effects are larger when information is surprising or highlights contrast, but do not vary with decision relevance, consistent with bottom-up attention. Causal forest estimates provide further evidence that learning and salience are both important drivers of changes in voting behaviour. We develop a simple model that integrates salience theory into a standard probabilistic voting framework to explain our results.

“Improving Property Tax Collection in Urban India”, with Shreya Singh and Wendy Wong. [Draft, May 2026]

Abstract: Rapidly expanding urban centers create opportunities for local governments to broaden their own-source revenue base, but realizing this potential requires effective tax administration. In collaboration with the government of the capital city of Bihar, India’s least-developed state, we randomly assigned over 120,000 registered property owners to receive one of five SMS treatments ahead of an early-payment deadline: basic reminder, social benefit appeal, ease of payment, social benefit appeal and ease of payment, or penalty salience. Relative to the basic reminder, messages highlighting the ease of paying taxes increased early-payment probability by 1.0 percentage point, raising total collection in that period by approximately 7.1%. These effects were concentrated among owners who paid taxes in the previous year and flat owners, and they faded by the end of the fiscal year. For previous-year payers, messages describing public services funded by tax revenue led to a sustained 0.6 percentage-point higher probability of payment and a 4.4% increase in total taxes paid.

“Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Impacts of Open Meetings in State Legislatures”. [Draft, May 2026]

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of increased de jure transparency of representative actions in the U.S. state legislative setting. I exploit variation in the timing of enactment across U.S. states of open meetings laws which ostensibly increase the public availability of information on legislator behavior to consider impacts on: bill introduction and enactment, state expenditure, confidence in government, and candidate and voter behavior in state elections. As recent work shows that increased remoteness of capital cities in U.S. states is strongly associated with reduced accountability and worse government performance, I also investigate how the impacts of open meetings vary with state capital isolation. Open meetings increase spending on public goods and heighten confidence in state government in the average legislature. Heterogeneous impacts on incumbent vote share suggest that at both low and high levels of initial accountability, open meetings provide citizens with additional information that influences voting.

Research in Progress

“Can Smart Technology Systems Improve Social Protection? - Bihar Extension”, with Rohini Pande and Charity Troyer Moore.
Status: Field experiment and data collection complete; analysis ongoing

“Leveraging Local Electoral Accountability to Improve Service Delivery”, with Jenna Allard, Rohini Pande, and Charity Troyer Moore.
Status: Field experiment and data collection complete; analysis ongoing